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Abstract
Pre-trained language models (PTLM) have
greatly improved performance on common-
sense inference benchmarks, however, it re-
mains unclear whether they share a human’s
ability to consistently make correct inferences
under perturbations. Prior studies of PTLMs
have found inference deficits, but have failed
to provide a systematic means of understand-
ing whether these deficits are due to low in-
ference abilities or poor inference robustness.
In this work, we address this gap by devel-
oping a procedure that allows for the system-
atized probing of both PTLMs’ inference abil-
ities and robustness. Our procedure centers
around the methodical creation of logically-
equivalent, but syntactically-different sets of
probes, of which we create a corpus of 14,400
probes coming from 60 logically-equivalent
sets that can be used to probe PTLMs in three
task settings. We find that despite the re-
cent success of large PTLMs on commonsense
benchmarks, their performances on our probes
are no better than random guessing (even with
fine-tuning) and are heavily dependent on bias-
esthe poor overall performance unfortunately
inhibits us from studying robustness. We hope
our approach and initial probe set will assist
future work in improving PTLMs’ inference
abilities, while also providing a probing set to
test robustness under several linguistic varia-
tionscode and data will be released.1
1 Introduction
Pre-trained language models (PTLMs) such
as BERT, RoBERTa, GPT-2, ALBERT, and
BART (Liu et al., 2019; Radford et al.; Lan et al.,
2019; Lewis et al., 2019) outperform previous
state-of-the-art models on multiple natural lan-
guage understanding (NLU) benchmarks, includ-
ing those designed to test commonsense reasoning
1Our data and code is located at https://github.
com/INK-USC/ReasonBERT. (Work in progress.)
The trophy doesn’t fit in the suitcase 
because it is too small. What is too small? 
A: the trophy B: the suitcase
Property(A, size, x) ^ 
Property(B, size, y) ^ Less(x, y)
----> ¬Relation(A, B, contain)
The trophy doesn’t fit in 
the suitcase because the 
[MASK] is too small. 
Underlying Logic
A is smaller than B, so A is [MASK] likely to contain B
A is smaller than B, so A is [MASK] likely to fit into B
B is smaller than A, so B is [MASK] likely to contain A
Linguistically-Varied Statements
[MASK] suitcase
less
less
more more
more
more
Figure 1: Humans solve inference questions by reason-
ing on the underlying logic of the question, thus linguis-
tically variation has little affect on our abilities. Incon-
sistency in PTLMs’ predictions when faced with lin-
guistic variation caused us to attempt to provide a sys-
tematic approach of evaluating a model’s understand-
ing of the underlying logic in an inference question.
such as the Winograd Schema Challenge
(WSC) (Levesque et al., 2012). Several studies
have found that simply fine-tuning these PTLMs
yield better performance than task-specific mod-
els (Trinh and Le, 2018; Kocijan et al., 2019). How-
ever, a growing body of work suggests this per-
formance does not necessarily imply that PTLMs
possess robust reasoning abilities (Talmor et al.,
2019; Zhou et al., 2019; Kwon et al., 2019). Un-
fortunately, prior attempts at examining PTLMs’
abilities to answer probes designed to expose
human-like inference abilities been isolated to spe-
cific areas of knowledge and have not systemati-
cally tested the robustness of the PTLM’s abilities.
Thus, in this work we present a process to create
probes that allow us to systematically understand
if PTLMs posses inference abilities and if these
abilities are robust.
We draw inspiration for our process from how
humans approach inference problems. (Schank and
Abelson, 1977) showed that humans translate nat-
ural language statements into underlying logical
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representations and then reason using these repre-
sentations. These representations are robust to para-
phrasing since diverse textual statements can lead
to the same reasoning results, as shown in Fig. 1.
Language models are often thought to have a simi-
lar ability to map statements into a representational
space that achieves conceptual generalization (Ben-
gio et al., 2003). However, we do not know if these
mappings act in the same ways a human’s does
when faced with an inference task expressed in
natural languageconsistent inferences on linguis-
tically diverse statements that share logical equiv-
alence. We are thus motivated to design a new
probing approach that evaluates whether PTLMs
possess human-like reasoning capabilities.
We propose a systematic procedure to construct
a reasoning probe seta set of probes that would
require human-like inference abilities to solve. The
reasoning probes are defined in terms of first-order
logic formulae, which capture the formalized logic
of each probe, and thus can act as templates to gen-
erate probes. We also introduce a set of linguistic
perturbations that can be applied to the logic un-
derlying each reasoning probe to produce logically-
equivalent statements with differing subject forms.
Finally, we introduce novel entities that are random
strings such as “prindag” to fill in the templates,
allowing us to isolate entity knowledge from rea-
soning. A PTLM’s performance on such probes
would expose how close it’s mapping function is to
that of a human’s.
To demonstrate the power and generality of our
framework, we construct 60 sets of probes, each
containing 24 types of perturbations, and involving
10 random strings, yielding a total of 14,400 logical
statements to test PTLMs. We evaluate PTLM’s
performance on three different tasks: masked word
prediction, sentence probability, and textual entail-
ment (or Natural Language Inference, NLI) using
probes constructed from the procedure shown in
Figure 2. Surprisingly, the performances of SOTA
models such as RoBERTa and GPT-2 are no better
than random guessing on our probes while humans
can reach around 85%. We then fine-tune on a parti-
tion of 80% our probes, validate using another 10%,
and find that when testing the fine-tuned model on
the rest, PTLMs still performs like random guess-
ing. Furthermore, we identify a set of pervasive
intrinsic biases in PTLMs that compromise their
ability to effectively answer reasoning probes. We
also use a gradient-based interpretation model to
1. Basic Predicates
• Property(A,m,x)
• Comparator(x,y)
• Relation(A,B,n)
2. General Templates
Prop(A,m,x) ^
Prop(B,m,y) ^
Comp(x,y)
à ¬Rel(A,B,n)
Prop(A,size,x) ^ 
Prop(B,size,y) ^ 
Less(x,y) à
¬Rel(A,B,contain)
3. Logic Forms
Property Relation
Size Contain
… …
4. Probe Sets
A is smaller than B,
so A is [MASK]
likely to contain B.
Linguistic Operators
…
Figure 2: Overview of the workflow of our probe con-
struction process. The output is a set linguistically-
diverse of masked sentences that follow the same rea-
soning template.
try to find the contextual clues that PTLMs look at
when making the predictions on our probes.
In summary, the contributions of our work are
three-fold. First, we propose a systematic approach
to generate logically-equivalent, but syntactically-
different probes to evaluate PTLMs’ logical infer-
ence capabilities. Then we construct 14,400 state-
ments following our proposed approach to evaluate
PTLMs using masked word prediction, sentence
probability and NLI. Finally, we present results
from an extensive set of experiments ablation stud-
ies and find that despite the success on existing
benchmarks, SOTA PTLMs fails to correctly infer
on our statements, even after fine-tuning.
2 Probe Construction Procedure
Our goal is to generate a set of linguistically-
diverse commonsense statements that express the
same underlying logical reasoning. In this section,
we describe this construction process in detail. As
shown in Figure 2, the process contains four steps.
We first define a few general logical predicates.
Next, we construct high-level first-order logic tem-
plates that capture a broad set of reasoning tasks.
Third, we use background knowledge to partially
ground templates into specific logic instances. Fi-
nally, we apply linguistic perturbation operators on
the logical form to generate multiple paraphrases.
These perturbations produce a diverse set of natural
language sentences to probe PTLMs.
2.1 Define Basic Predicates
We start with defining three general predicates that
serve as the basic building blocks for the logical
formulations.
• PROP(A,m, x) indicates that the property
m of A is x, for example, PROP(A, size, x)
means the size of A is x.
• REL(A,B, n) indicates that A and B has a
relation of n, for example, REL(A,B, parent)
means that A is B’s parent.
• CMP(x, y) denotes that x is more or less than
y.
Our procedure can work with any predicates, but
in this work, we focus on these three due to their
generality and the ability to produce multiple para-
phrases expressing the same logic. Specifically,
PROP(A,m, x) and REL(A,B, n) are very com-
mon edge types in many knowledge bases like Con-
ceptNet (Liu and Singh, 2004), so we can easily fill
knowledge from them into our logic templates. As
for linguistic diversity, CMP(A,B), for example,
can be phrased as “A is more than B”, “B is less
than A”, “A is not less than B”, etc., and we can test
PTLM’s robustness on many more different types
of linguistic variations.
2.2 Compose Logical Templates from
Predicates
From the three defined basic predicates, we form
logical templates by combining predicates using
first order logical connectives like ∧,→, etc. We
define a logical template to be a general form that
can be grounded into many first order logical forms
by filling the template with actual entities and rela-
tions.
For example, we consider the logical inference
from a relation between two entities to a compar-
ison of their properties. We can use→ as the in-
ference step, with the REL(A,B, n) predicate in
the antecedent, indicating that the premise is A is
of relation n to B. In the consequent, we com-
pare a particular property of A and B, using the
CMP(x, y) predicate to compare the two values of
PROP(A,m, x) and PROP(B,m, y). Thus we can
form the final first-order logical template for this
inference as REL(A,B, n) → PROP(A,m, x) ∧
PROP(B,m, y) ∧ CMP(x, y). In the next section,
we describe how these general templates are par-
tially grounded by introducing specific common-
sense knowledge, allowing us to produce reasoning
tasks.
RELATION PROPERTYCOMPARISON
priest prays more
doctor takes more care
parent is older
teacher is more informed
... ...
Table 1: Knowledge table to fill in the text template “A is B’s
[RELATION], so A [PROPERTYCOMPARISON] than B.”
2.3 Fill Templates with Knowledge Tables
We use knowledge tables to ground the high-level
templates to logic forms that represent a specific
logical inference. We first construct a textual tem-
plate corresponding to each first-order logical tem-
plate with blanks that embed the underlying logic.
Consider the template of property-comparison in-
ference described above, the textual template can
be “A is B’s [RELATION], so A [PROPERTY-
COMPARISON] than B.” with [RELATION] and
[PROPERTYCOMPARISON] being blanks that are
filled. Table 1 shows examples of commonsense
concepts used to generate specific instances. The
generality of the predicates in our templates allows
us to use many commonsense knowledge resources,
such as ConceptNet (Liu and Singh, 2004) and
ATOMIC (Sap et al., 2019), to automatically pop-
ulate these knowledge tables. For example, Con-
ceptNet contains the (priest, is capable of, praying)
triplet in ConceptNet that can fill in the template
above.
2.4 Generate Probe Sets Using Perturbation
Operators
After grounding the logical templates, these logi-
cal relationships are expressed in natural language.
In addition to a straightforward expression of the
logical template directly into language, we define
several perturbations that generate an equivalent
logical statement but introduce linguistic variation.
By defining multiple perturbation operators and ap-
plying them on logical atoms, we are able to form
a diverse set of statements to probe PTLMs.
Linguistic Operators We define seven types of
linguistic operators and the asymmetry operator
to facilitate and formalize perturbations, shown
in Table 2. We construct the last four operators
by combining some of the single operators listed
in the first three rows. Note that for “Negation”,
“Antonym”, “Paraphrase Inversion”, and “Negation
Paraphrase” types, the logic of the original phrase is
LINGUISTIC OPERATOR EXAMPLE
Negation Neg(fit into) = not fit into
Antonym Ant(fit into) = contain
Paraphrase Para(fit into) = put into
Paraphrase Inversion Para(Ant(fit into)) = Para(contain)= hold inside
Negation Antonym Neg(Ant(fit into)) = Neg(contain)= not contain
Negation Paraphrase Neg(Para(fit into)) = Neg(put into)= not put into
Negation Para Inv
Neg(Para(Ant(fit into))) = Neg(para(
contain))= Neg(hold inside)
=not hold inside
Table 2: Linguistic operators with their logical equiva-
lence and examples.
changed, so words in the probe have to be replaced
accordingly. For example, if we apply “Antonym”
operator to the probe “A is smaller than B, so A is
more likely to fit into B”, we will get “A is smaller
than B, so A is less likely to contain B”.
Asymmetry Operator Our logical templates
use several strongly-ordered comparisons and
relationships. This strong ordering property
allows us to introduce asymmetries that pre-
serve meaning. For our predicates REL(A,B, n)
and CMP(A,B), when we swap the positions
of A and B, the meaning flips. For ex-
ample, MORE(A,B) = ¬MORE(B,A) and
REL(A,B, parent) = ¬REL(B,A, parent). Us-
ing this feature, we can swap the positions of
two entities for these predicates and the logic will
also be flipped, so we denote this perturbation as
ASYM(P(A,B)) = P(B,A) = ¬P(A,B).
Finally, we apply the defined operators to the pa-
rameters in the logic forms and manually write text
templates for converting logic forms to sentences
with diverse perturbations. We have eight forms of
linguistic perturbations including the original (un-
perturbed) one, and we can apply the asymmetry
operators either on the premise or conclusion or
keep the original ordering. Thus we have in total
of 24 types of perturbations.
3 Experiment Setup
This section presents our setup to probe LMs. We
will describe our tasks and metrics to evaluate the
LMs and then show the probes we construct fol-
lowing Section 2. Unlike most prior work that uses
one task to probe the models, we use three tasks to
test LMs’ commonsense reasoning capability. We
argue that each task evaluates some degree of the
commonsense reasoning ability of the LMs, but
does not provide a comprehensive picture. For ex-
Masked Word Prediction: 
A prindag is lighter than a fluberg, so a prindag should float [MASK] 
than a fluberg. [more] or [less]
Novel Entity Pair:
prindag and fluberg
Sentence Probability: 
A prindag is …, so …. more than a fluberg. [Correct]
VS
A prindag is …, so … less than a fluberg. [Incorrect]
Textual Entailment: 
(S1: A prindag is lighter than a fluberg. S2: A prindag should float more 
than a fluberg.): [Entailment]
(S1: A prindag is lighter than a fluberg. S2: A prindag should float less 
than a fluberg.): [Contradiction]
Figure 3: Illustration of our three considered evaluation
settings to probe PTLMs with an example pair of novel
entities.
ample, in masked word prediction, the machine
is asked to predict the most likely word to fill in
the blank given the context, not necessarily test
reasoning. However, we draw conclusions from ex-
perimental results on three distinct evaluation tasks,
aiming to provide convincing and comprehensive
probing insights.
3.1 Evaluation Tasks
A general illustration of three tasks is shown in
Figure 3 and we will describe each task in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
Masked Word Prediction We adopt the Masked
LM pre-training objective from BERT (Devlin
et al., 2019) to evaluate LMs on our constructed
probes in a zero-shot setting to remove the effects
of fine-tuning (Hewitt and Liang, 2019; Talmor
et al., 2019) and probe only the pre-trained rep-
resentations. We always mask words in the con-
sequent of our probes to focus on the inference
performance. Additionally, we choose to mask the
words that not only require common-sense reason-
ing, but also restrict our masking to words where
only a few options are appropriate logically and
syntactically. For example, in the probe “A is B’s
parent, so A is more likely to care for B”, we mask
“more”.
Sentence Probability We also evaluate LMs
by feeding whole sentences into the model and
comparing their probabilities by multiplying each
word’s probability conditioned on the previous
words, i.e., the causal language modeling loss. For
each probe, we pair it with a counterfactual state-
ment by swapping the masked word in the above
LOGICAL TEMPLATE EXAMPLE
PROP(A,m, g) ∧ PROP(B,m, s)→
PROP(A, t, x) ∧ PROP(B, t, y) ∧ COMP(x, y)
A is made out of glass, B is made out of stone,
so A is more transparent than B
REL(A,B, p)→ PROP(A, p, x)
∧PROP(B, p, y) ∧ COMP(x, y) A is B’s priest, so A spends more time praying than B
PROP(A, v, x) ∧ ¬PROP(B, v, x)→
PROP(A, s, x) ∧ PROP(B, s, y) ∧ COMP(x, y) A makes the varsity team while B does not, so A is more skilled than B
PROP(A, c, x) ∧ PROP(B, c, y) ∧ COMP(x, y)→
PROP(A, e, x) ∧ PROP(B, e, y) ∧ COMP(x, y) A is able to concentrate more than B , so A is more effective than B
Table 3: General first-order logical templates we construct for our probes and an example for each template in
natural language.
evaluation setting with its opposite. In the example
above, we create that probe’s pair as: “A is B’s
parent, so A is less likely to care for B”.
Textual Entailment The last evaluation we con-
sider is the most challenging setting of the three.
Since all of our probes can be separated into a
premise and a conclusion, we treat them as pairs
and ask LMs to classify their relationships from
three classes: entailment, neutral, and contradic-
tion, used in Natural Language Inference (NLI).
Since vanilla pre-trained LM cannot directly be ap-
plied to this task, we use a version of the LM that is
fine-tuned on the MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018)
dataset. Note that although the LMs are fine-tuned,
we do not train or fine-tune on our probes.
3.2 Evaluation Metrics
Binary Accuracy For masked word prediction,
we evaluate by simply comparing the rankings of
the masked word and the other candidate with the
opposite meaning. For example, in the masked
probe: “A is B’s parent, so A takes [MASK] care
of B,” “more” is the right answer and “less” is the
wrong answer. In the binary setting, we feed the
masked sentence to the LMs and give the model
score 1 if the right answer appears higher than the
wrong answer, and 0 otherwise. For the sentence
probability task, the binary classification is com-
paring the probabilities of the sentence pair, one
with the right answer and the other with the wrong
answer. We assign scores similarly to the masked
word prediction task and average across our probes
to get the accuracy.
Confidence Ratio To address the nuances in the
ranking and probability scores given by the LMs,
we further propose a metric called confidence ra-
tio setting. Using the example above for masked
word prediction, we denote the predicted score
for “more” as scoreright and that for “less” as
scorewrong. Then we calculate our final score
using: (scoreright − scorewrong)/(scoreright +
scorewrong). The more positive the final score is,
the better the performance according to this metric,
and vice versa. The absolute value of this score
indicates how confident the LM is for this predic-
tion. Similarly, for the sentence probability task,
we use the probability score of the correct input
sentence from LMs as scoreright, that of the in-
correct sentence as scorewrong, and calculate the
confidence ratio using the same formula. Note that
for the textual entailment task, the model directly
predicts a label for a pair of sentences, so we use
accuracy of the labels predicted as other work on
textual entailment and NLI.
3.3 Language Models
We evaluate a wide range of state-of-the-art lan-
guage models covering both masked and unidirec-
tional language models to fit in our different set-
tings. For the masked word prediction task, we
consider RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019) with base
and large versions and ALBERT (Lan et al., 2019),
two recent masked language models that show
good results on many benchmarks. For sentence
probability, we consider GPT-2 (Radford et al.),
a large language model for left-2-right language
generation and COMET (Bosselut et al., 2019),
a generative model with backbone being GPT-2
and is further trained on large knowledge bases
such as ConceptNet (Liu and Singh, 2004) and
ATOMIC (Sap et al., 2019) so we consider it as a
commonsense knowledge-augmented model. For
the task of textual entailment, we use one masked
language model RoBERTa and one sequence-to-
sequence model BART (Lewis et al., 2019), both
fine-tuned on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018).
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Figure 4: Results of average accuracy and confidence
ratio of 3 masked language models on the masked word
prediction setting. All the accuracies are close to 0.5,
indicating that the models’ performance is no better
than random guessing. The associated confidence ra-
tios are close to 0, as a result of the model being equally
confident both when it is right or wrong.
3.4 Probing Data
Following the process in Section 2, we construct
four logical templates from the basic predicates,
shown in Table 3
Then we use knowledge tables to fill in each
template and finally apply the perturbation opera-
tors as described before to form a final set of 1,440
linguistically-varied statements. To avoid conflat-
ing fact-based recall with commonsense reasoning,
we use novel entities in all probing tasks. These
entities are randomly generated character strings
from length 3 to 12 that are assumed to be not seen
in the training data of the LMs. By generating mul-
tiple instances of each template with different novel
entities, we minimize the influence of our random
generation of meaningful sub-words on the overall
results. For each masked statement, we randomly
generate 10 novel entities to fill in positions of A
and B so we actually evaluate LMs using 14,400
probes.
4 Result Analysis and Discussion
We show the results of probing the state-of-the-
art pre-trained language models, using the setup
described above and provide analysis centered
around the question raised in Section 1: can the
LM consistently make correct predictions on a set
of logically-equivalent, but syntactically-different
statements? We will first examine the general per-
formance of multiple language models on each task,
show fine-tuning results on our probes, and present
ablation studies to analyze the performances more
thoroughly.
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Figure 5: Results of average accuracy and confidence
ratio of 3 generative language models on the sentence
probability task. We see a similar pattern to the masked
word prediction results.
LM’s performance is on par or worse than ran-
dom guessing in all settings. As shown in Fig-
ure 4, the average binary accuracies of all three
masked language models on the task of masked
word prediction are around 0.5. Similarly, the con-
fidence value of the predicted answer is close to
0, which is a result of the model being extremely
confident in its guessesconfident incorrect guesses
will have a confidence score near -1, while con-
fident correct guesses will have a score near 1,
thus the two cancel each other out and the aver-
age accuracy is close to 0. A random baseline that
chooses between the two comparative words per
probe would have an accuracy of 0.5 and a confi-
dence score of 0, meaning that the tested masked
language models barely beat a model that random
guesses. Figure 5 shows the same statistics but
with generative language models on the sentence
probability task setting. We see the same pattern
as the performances of masked language models:
the average accuracies are around 0.5 and confi-
dence ratios are 0, indicating that the inability to
reason properly on our probes also applies to gen-
erative models. Moreover, COMET can be con-
sidered as a commonsense knowledge-augmented
model since it is trained on commonsense knowl-
edge bases (ConceptNet or ATOMIC), but we do
not see a clear improvement from directly training
on triplets from the knoweledge bases.
As for the textual entailment or NLI setting, Fig-
ure 6 presents the average accuracies of two models
fine-tuned on MNLI dataset and tested on the tex-
tual entailment task. We only provide sentence
pairs with entailment and contradiction labels by
splitting the premises and the conclusions of our
probes with the correct and incorrect comparatives,
respectively, since recognizing neutral pairs is not
related to our goal of probing reasoning. We find
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Figure 6: Results of average accuracies for predicting
entailment and contradiction labels of 2 language mod-
els fine-tuned on MNLI. They are well below random
guessing and for both models. We also notice a gap
between the performance on entailment pairs and con-
tradiction pairs for RoBERTa.
that RoBERTa and BART fine-tuned on MNLI per-
form far below the random guessing (0.33) for
three-way classification. After looking at their pre-
dictions, we find that they are mostly predicting
the neutral label, showing that they do not under-
stand the underlying logic in most of the probes,
regardless of being correct or not, and they predict
that the sentence pairs do not entail or contradict
at all. We also find that RoBERTa fine-tuned on
MNLI has a much higher accuracy on predicting
the contradiction labels compared to entailment,
while BART does not show this gap.
Furthermore, when we look into the average
performance for each logically-equivalent but
syntactically-different probe set, Figure 7 shows
that the average accuracies for all sets are close to
0.5. The same pattern also applies to other models
on the two other settings, indicating that the ran-
dom guessing like performance is consistent across
different probes.
These unsatisfactory results of multiple SOTA
language models on three different settings is at
sharp contrast to their substantial performance
improvements on many commonsense reasoning
benchmarks. From these results, we deduce that
while PTLMs can be fine-tuned to perform well on
many commonsense reasoning tasks, they do not
show this same performance on our probes in the
settings tested.
Fine-tuning does not help Given this deviation
from previous results in a zero-shot setting, the nat-
ural next step is to investigate LM’s performance
on our probes after fine-tuning. We follow the
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Figure 7: Results of average accuracy of RoBERTa-
large on the masked word prediction task. We can see
that the PTLM consistently makes random-guessing
like predictions across all logically-equivalent sets.
standard 80/10/10 split for train/valid/test, making
sure that all probes from the same logically equiv-
alent sets appeared in the same split to prevent
boosted performance resulting from overfitting to
the training data. We fine-tune RoBERTa-base and
RoBERTa-large on the masked language modeling
task and GPT-2 on the causal language modeling
task for 30 epoches. After each epoch we test the
fine-tuned model on our validation set, and save the
model with the highest validation set performance.
However, all this fine-tuning provides no real
aid to RoBERTa’s ability to perform well on our
probe set, as seen in Figure 8. Again the accuracies
hover around 0.5 like random guessing, indicating
RoBERTa and GPT-2 are as confused as it was be-
fore the fine-tuning. Even though they have now
been shown the majority of our probe set, mean-
ing that they have seen many sentences that are
very similar in syntax to the test set, it still fails
to reason correctly, strengthening the conclusion
from previously observed results of PTLM’s rea-
soning abilities. We also believe that this inability
to improve after fine-tuning shows the challeng-
ing nature of our dataset, which cannot be trivially
solved by fine-tuning.
Diagnosing PTLMs: heavy language biases
Surprised by LM’s poor performance even after
fine-tuning, we want to dive deeper into the predic-
tions to see what is happening. In our experiment
setups, we center the evaluation around pairs of
comparative words: we ask models to predict the
mask comparative, find the sentence containing
the right word, and predict the relationship (entail-
ment or contradiction) of sentence pairs with dif-
ferent comparatives. We use three distinct pairs
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Figure 8: Fine-tuning results of average accuracy with
80/10/10 split for train/valid/test. We see that there is no clear
different between the performance before and after fine-tuning
and it is still like random guessing.
of comparative words in evaluation, ‘more” or
“less”,“easier” or “harder” and “better” or “worse”.
The seeming randomness of PTLM’s performance
prompted us to inspect our results more closely,
and we subsequently uncovered a strong bias in
model’s response. We initially found that PTLMs
heavily favor predicting “more” over “less”, in 94%
of statements, “better” over “worse” in 93%, and
“easier” over “harder” in 81%. These results in-
dicate a heavy bias as there are equal number of
statements where each word in a given pair is the
correct answer.
We generalize this pattern to the fact that when
PTLMs are asked to infer a comparative relation-
ship between the property of two entities, the model
is heavily biased towards predicting the positive va-
lence words regardless of what property we are
comparingi.e. regardless of the logic in the state-
ment. Table 4 shows that the accuracy for “posi-
tive valence”words is a lot higher than “negative
valence” words. Fine-tuning on the our probes,
which have a balanced number of sentences con-
taining positive and negative comparatives, does
not help mitigate this bias for RoBERTa, but help
for GPT-2. This bias towards positive valence is
further evidence that PTLMs tested do not reason
on our probes like humans in these settings, but
rather attempts to pattern match.
Comparison with humans In order to ensure
that our probe set is truly testing commonsense, we
conducted a small human evaluation on a portion
of our dataset. If our probe set is indeed testing
commonsense, humans should be able to perform
quite strongly on the test we devise. Our human
evaluation was conducted on a 5% sample of our
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Figure 9: Ablation study results of average perfor-
mance of PTLMs across one third of the probes. These
probes involve social interactions where we replaced
our usual novel entities with real names. We still see
the consistent poor performance, indicating that using
random strings is not hindering PTLMs’ ability.
probes, where 20 people were asked to choose the
more probable word between a pair of opposite
comparative words (such as “more” and “less”)
that best completed the logic in a sentencethe com-
parative word would fill in a blank in the sentence.
The results is shown in the last column in Table 4.
While the number of datapoints (20) isn’t large
enough to be fully confident in our summary statis-
tics, the average human performance is 85% with
inter-annotator agreement 0.768 which is substan-
tial agreement, showing that humans are generally
able to perform this task, thus suggesting we are in-
deed testing commonsense. We also have reason to
believe this number is not too far off a larger sam-
ple’s mean, as 16 out of 20 people scored above
an 85%. It is also worth noting that humans do
not exhibit the same bias towards positive valence
words observed in PTLMs
Ablation study and observations of novel entity
usage As mentioned in the previous section, we
use pairs of novel entities to prevent information
about the correct logic of the sentence being leaked
by real entities. While we do conduct an ablation
study on a portion of our probes to test the effect
of novel entities, it is important to mention that
the dominant trend is that no matter what pair of
novel entities were substituted into the probes, the
machine’s answer rarely changed. In fact out of
the 1440 probes we constructed, 1343 (over 93%)
of them always resulted in the same answer across
all ten trials regardless of the novel entities being
used. This strongly suggests that our novel entity
generation and substitution process has had little to
Model Acc on “Pos” Acc on “Neg”
RB-base 0.872 0.125
RB-large 0.899 0.122
ALBERT 0.734 0.246
RB-base-ft 0.878 0.092
RB-large-ft 0.775 0.158
GPT-2 0.777 0.209
GPT-2-ft 0.509 0.483
CM-CN 0.698 0.294
CM-A 0.664 0.332
Human 0.831 0.863
Table 4: Summary of PTLMs performances on probes
that contain a positive valence word such as “more”,
“better”, and “easier” versus that contains a negative va-
lence words such as “less”, “worse”, and “harder”. We
see a clear gap between the accuracy of the two types
of probes, even after the models are fine-tuned, with
one exception: fine-tuning GPT-2 seems not remove
this bias. We also find that humans do not exhibit such
bias.
no effect on LM’s reasoning abilitywhich is exactly
what we wanted.
In order to ensure our novel entity usage wasn’t
hindering LM’s ability to reason, we conducted an
ablation study on 480 of our probes, one third of
our full dataset. These 480 probes involved social
commonsense and so the novel entities were be-
ing used instead of people’s names. We conduct
ablation by switching back to common real peo-
ple’s names so that the probes look like normal
sentences. As Figure 9 shows, the performances
of all the models on three settings do not change
much, again strongly suggesting that the novel en-
tities are of little concern to PTLMs when making
the decision as to what words should fill in the
masked word. Our usage of novel entities does not
seem to introduce helpful or distracting sub-words,
nor does the introduction of novel entities seem
to bother the models, as there is no difference in
performance with or without them.
Does explicitly providing commonsense knowl-
edge help? Shocked by the severe bias observed
in PTLMs, we construct an easier set of probes,
where we explicitly state all knowledge needed to
make the correct logical inference. We have two
settings for this test, one where parroting the now-
provided commonsense fact is all that is needed to
correctly answer the probe, and the other where a
simple negation switch of the commonsense fact is
needed to solve the probe:
• A is made of glass, B is made of stone, and
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Figure 10: Results of average performance of PTLMs
when we provide background knowledge in our probes. For
RoBERTa, ALBERT, and GPT-2, we notice a huge increase
in accuracy when provided knowledge. However, we find that
they are merely parroting what appears in the context since
when we apply a negation in the probe, which should change
the prediction, they are simply predicting the same as the
context shows, resulting in performance drop. For COMET
moddels and models tested on the NLI setting, we do not
observe the same pattern and it seems that adding knowledge
does not help or hurt.
glass is more transparent than stone, so A is
[MASK] transparent than stone. (parrot)
• A is made of glass, B is made of stone, and
glass is more transparent than stone, so A is
not [MASK] transparent than stone. (negation
switch)
We do this so to investigate whether RoBERTa is
actually able to use the provided commonsense fact,
or is it possibly just pattern matching.
We add this piece of background knowledge to
the 60 original (unperturbed) statements along with
their corresponding negated statements to form an
“easier” setting of our task. As shown in Figure 10,
we find two patterns PTLMs exhibit. For RoBERTa,
ALBERT, and GPT-2, there is a stark difference in
performance between the two settings. When they
are being asked to parrot the commonsense fact,
the performances jump up to near perfect scores,
however when all they have to do is the equivalent
of applying a negation operator on the fact, they
fail even worse than when they are not provided the
fact. These results suggest that in the parrot easier
setting, it is likely RoBERTa, ALBERT, and GPT-2
are just parroting the commonsense fact they see in
the sentence and not utilizing some sort of reason-
ing ability, as when asked to perform the simplest
of logical operations they fail. The other pattern
we notice is that providing background knowledge
does not help or hurt the performances for COMET
and models tested on the textual entailment task.
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Figure 11: Results of average accuracy and confidence ratio
across all the probes separated by the type of linguistic per-
turbations of ALBERT on masked word prediction. We do
not see much variance for differnet perturbations, mainly due
to the strong bias of predicting positive valence comparative
words.
For COMET models, this may be due to the fact
that COMET is trained on triplets from knowledge
bases: given a head entity and a relation, predict
the tail entity, so it is not used to taking auxiliary
knowledge into its input. As for models fine-tuned
on MNLI, the performance stays unchanged be-
cause they still think most of the sentence pairs of
our probes are neutral, failing to grasp the embed-
ded logical inference step.
Are PTLMs robust to perturbations? We can-
not say for certain due to poor general performance
and severe bias. Since the overall performances
are close to random and the heavy bias towards
positive valence words, we can only say that there
are some variations for each perturbation applied.
As Figure 11 shows, average performance for each
perturbation type does not have much variation and
we find a similar phenomenon for other models.
This does not show that PTLMs are robust to lin-
guistic perturbations since the accuracies are all
random guessing like. We do like to note that the
linguistically-varied nature of our probe sets still
provides robustness test for models, but here due to
the overall unsatisfactory results of current PTLMs,
we do not get much insights from this perspective.
What contextual clues do the models use when
making predictions on our probes? We want
to dive into PTLMs’ behaviors on our probes more
by trying to find what are the most important words
in the probes when they make predictions. We use
the SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al., 2017) algorithm
from AllenNLP Interpret (Wallace et al., 2019) on
masked word prediction on our probes with real
people’s names (the same set as our ablation study)
using BERT. We find that the interpretations are not
very consistent as the most important words change
when we input the same sentence for multiple times
and will also change when different names are used,
so we conduct 5 trials with different names for each
probe and pick the words that appear in the majority
of the trials. We have the following preliminary
findings.
When aggregated across all probe sets, we find
that the three most frequent words BERT finds most
important when making the predictions according
to SmoothGrad are: “than”, “not”, and “so”, which
makes sense because “than” indicates that we are
asking for a comparative, “not” is the negation
indicator, and “so” hints the causal relationship in
our probes. However, noticing these clues does
not necessarily mean that the model comprehends
the logical implication of them. In other words,
PTLM, in this case BERT, knows that these words
are important when making a decision, but it does
not know how to properly answer the questions
based on these lexical signals.
5 Related Work
Machine commonsense logic has been studied for
a long history. Most classical works primarily fo-
cus on executing symbolic rules as hand-crafted
programs for machines to learn (Mccarthy, 1960).
Recent attempts mainly generate templatic ques-
tions, such as those in the bAbI dataset (Weston
et al., 2015), to test whether neural networks are
able to reason via executing long chains of logic op-
erations. Given the huge success of PTLMs (Devlin
et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019) in natural language
processing, we want to study whether, or to what
extent, PTLMs can reason with commonsense.
Prior works in analyzing the (commonsense)
reasoning ability of PTLMs have primarily fo-
cused on creating probing tasks by generating
ad-hoc masked sentences either from knowledge
bases (Petroni et al., 2019; Feldman et al., 2019) or
existing datasets. The first line of works aim to test
if PTLMs can work as knowledge bases (e.g. Con-
ceptNet, Freebase) in terms of retrieving factual or
commonsense knowledge by triple prediction tasks.
LAMA and its following work (Petroni et al., 2019;
Jiang et al., 2019) designed relational templates
as masked sentences and then test if pre-trained
PTLMs such as BERT or RoBERTa can correctly
recover the missing one-hop relations. Correctly
retrieving factual triples does not necessarily mean
that PTLMs can reason with them. Our work, in
contrast, focuses on higher-order reasoning chains,
which requires PTLMs to capture logical rules to
answer all different linguistic variations. We explic-
itly test if PTLMs can consistently predict missing
tokens in a set of paraphrases sharing the same
logical patterns.
The goal of the second line of work (Zhou et al.,
2019; Talmor et al., 2019; Kwon et al., 2019) is
to reuse existing datasets as probe tasks, such as
SWAG, PIQA (Bisk et al., 2019), and so on. Though
these kinds of probing tasks can directly show the
reasoning performance of PTLMs on downstream
tasks, it is still not clear if PTLMs really enjoy
the ability of mapping utterance to underlying log-
ical patterns for predicting masked tokens. The
success of PTLMs on these tasks may come from
simple statistical matching instead of reasoning.
As we seek to investigate whether PTLMs have
human-like reasoning ability, the probing tasks are
supposed to be centered around logical templates.
Our proposed logical templates assures that our
probing examples focus on reasoning instead of
retrieving frequent linguistic patterns.
6 Conclusion
In summary, we propose a systematic approach
to construct logically-equivalent, but syntactically
different masked statements to probe PTLMs. Fol-
lowing this approach, we generate in total 14,400
masked statements from 60 sets of probes, 24 types
of perturbations, and 10 fictitious entities and test
8 PTLMs on three different evaluation tasks. We
find that PTLM’s performance is comparable to
random guessing, has a strong bias towards pre-
dicting comparative words with positive valence,
and fine-tuning does not help. We further present
ablation studies strengthening the conclusion that
PTLMs fail to make human-like inferences on our
probes. Our approach and initial probe set can as-
sist future work in improving PTLMs’ inference
abilities, while also providing a probing set to test
model’s understanding of logical equivalence.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Probing Data Samples
We show all perturbations for one probe in Table 5
and all of our probe set’s unperturbed statement in
Table 6. We will release full data upon acceptance.
linguistic perturbation asymmetric perturbation probe
original original A is wider than B, so A finds it harder to slip through cracks than B
original asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A finds it easier to slip through cracks than B
original asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B finds it easier to slip through cracks than A
negation original A is wider than B, so A does not find it easier to slip through cracks than B
negation asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A does not find it harder to slip through cracks than B
negation asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B does not find it harder to slip through cracks than A
antonym original A is wider than B, so A finds it easier to be blocked by cracks than B
antonym asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A finds it harder to be blocked by cracks than B
antonym asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B finds it harder to be blocked by cracks than A
paraphrase original A is wider than B, so A is worse at fitting into openings than B
paraphrase asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A is better at fitting into openings than B
paraphrase asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B is better at fitting into openings than A
paraphrase inversion original A is wider than B, so A is more impeded by small openings than B
paraphrase inversion asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A is less impeded by small openings than B
paraphrase inversion asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B is less impeded by small openings than A
negation antonym original A is wider than B, so A does not find it harder to be blocked by cracks than B
negation antonym asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A does not find it easier to be blocked by cracks than B
negation antonym asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B does not find it easier to be blocked by cracks than A
negation paraphrase original A is wider than B, so A is not better at fitting into openings than B
negation paraphrase asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A is not worse at fitting into openings than B
negation paraphrase asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B is not worse at fitting into openings than A
negation paraphrase inversion original A is wider than B, so A is not less impeded by small openings than B
negation paraphrase inversion asymmetric premise B is wider than A, so A is not more impeded by small openings than B
negation paraphrase inversion asymmetric conclusion A is wider than B, so B is not more impeded by small openings than A
Table 5: An example probe set24 logically equivalent, but semantically different statements.
template probe
1 A is made out of glass and B is made out of stone, so A is more transparent than B
1 A is made out of cotton and B is made out of glass, so A is less sharp than B
1 A is made out of concrete and B is made out of paper, so A should be more heavy than B
1 A is made out of metal and B is made out of rubber, so A should float worse than B
1 A is made out of glass and B is made out of copper, so A is more fragile than B
1 A is made out of steel and B is made out of wool, so A is less soft than B
1 A is made out of wood and B is made out of glass, so A is more combustible than B
1 A is made out of sponge and B is made out of nylon, so A is worse for water resistance than B
1 A is made out of copper and B is made out of concrete, so A is more ductile than B
1 A is made out of metal and B is made out of cloth, so A is less foldable than B
1 A is made out of chocolate and B is made out of metal, so A is harder to keep frozen than B
1 A is made out of metal and B is made out of dirt, so A is a better electrical conductor than B
1 A is made out of stone and B is made out of helium, so A has a harder time flying than B
1 A is made out of honey and B is made out of water, so A is more viscous than B
1 A is made out of titanium and B is made out of rubber, so A is less elastic than B
1 A is made out of water and B is made out of methane, so A is more safe to store than B
1 A is made out of mercury and B is made out of oxygen, so A is worse for your health to consume than B
1 A is made out of wood and B is made out of fur, so A will more easily expand when heated than B
1 A is made out of concrete and B is made out of wood, so A is less penetrable than B
1 A is made out of glass and B is made out of tar, so A will reflect light better than B
3 A makes the varsity team while B does not, so A is more skilled than B
3 A is going to perform for people while B is not, so A finds it harder to be relaxed than B
3 A won the competition while B did not, so A finds it easier to be happy than B
4 A is able to concentrate more than B, so A finds it easier to be productive than B
3 A bullies people while B does not, so A is less kind than B
2 A is B’s boss, so A commands more respect than B
4 A has more work than B, so A finds it harder to be at ease than B
2 A has a crush on B, so A finds it harder to be relaxed around B
4 A has more dedication than B, so A will have a harder time failing than B
2 A is B’s parent, so A initially takes more care of B
2 A is B’s doctor, so A takes more care of B
2 A hurt B’s feelings, so A must be more insensitive than B
2 A is B’s priest, so A spends less time sinning than B
2 A is B’s lawyer, so A is less ignorant of the law than B
4 A has a lot less money than B, so A is less financially secure than B
4 A watches more tv shows than B, so A is more capable of understanding pop-culture references than B
2 A always loses to B in tennis, so A is a less proficient tennis player than B
2 A makes B late, so A has less reason to be annoyed at B
4 A is a better friend than B, so A is more thoughtful than B
2 A is B’s teacher, so A should be more informed than B
4 A is smaller than B, so A is easier to put into a box than B
4 A is heavier than B, so A is better at sinking than B
4 A is denser than B, so A should withstand piercing more easily than B
4 A is wider than B, so A finds it harder to slip through cracks than B
4 A is hotter than B, so A should be easier to melt than B
4 A is more elastic than B, so A should bounce better than B
4 A is tougher than B, so A is harder to rip apart than B
4 A is harder than B, so A is less comfortable than B
4 A is taller than B, so A will cast a more lengthy shadow than B
4 A is lighter than B, so A finds it harder to support weight than B
4 A has less momentum than B, so A has a worse ability to damage on impact than B
4 A is more luminous than B, so A is more dangerous to look at than B
4 A is more soluble than B, so A is harder to discern in water than B
4 A is more pungent than B, so A is easier to detect than B
4 A is smaller than B, so A finds it harder to displace liquid in a tub than B
4 A is shorter than B, so A is worse for keeping things out of reach than B
4 A is larger than B, so A is more difficult to carry than B
4 A is more taut than B, so A is worse at withstanding additional force than B
4 A is much hotter than B, so A will be more painful to hold onto than B
4 A is more magnetic than B, so A is harder to separate from another magnet than B
Table 6: The sixty probes we constructed and their cor-
responding templates
